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Abstract:  
The Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program “Oportunidades” has proven to be 
effective in improving access to education and health services for the poor in Mexico; 
however, the studies of the program’s impact on the work incentives of its rural indigenous 
participants are practically inexistent. For this reason, by applying a propensity score 
matching methodology, this research analyses the impact of Oportunidades on the labor 
supply of the indigenous and non-indigenous living in rural areas. The Average Treatment 
Effect estimates suggest that the positive income shock created by the CCT, does not 
affect the work incentives for any of the rural participants. Therefore, the hypothesis that 
the program creates the unwanted outcome of people working less and becoming 
dependent on the transfers (situation that would reduce the likelihood of the program 
alleviating poverty in the short-term) is rejected.	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  and	  acronyms	  	  
 
ATET Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
BF Programa Bolsa Familia 
CCT Conditional Cash Transfers 
CIA Conditional Independence Assumption 
CONAPO National Board of Population / Consejo Nacional de Población 
CONEVAL National Board of Evaluation of the Social Development Policy / 
Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo 
Social 
CS Chile Solidario 
ENIGH National Household Survey of Income and Expenditure / Encuesta 
Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares 
IC Programa Ingreso Ciudadano  
INEGI National Institute of Statistic and Geography / Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística y Geografía 
MWL Minimum Well-Being Line 
NN Nearest Neighbor Matching 
PAF Programa de Asignación de Familia 
PSM Propensity Score Matching 
RPS Red de Protección Ciudadana 
Sedesol Ministry of Social Development  / Secretaria de Desarrollo Social 
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Introduction	  
 
Since 1997, the Mexican government has been implementing Oportunidades, a 
program that aims to boost the human development of the population living below the 
Minimum Wellbeing Line1 (MWL) for them to break the intergenerational cycle of 
poverty. In order to achieve this goal, the Ministry of Social Development (Sedesol) 
provides monetary transfers to women under the condition of their children going to 
school, visiting periodically health clinics, and them attending communitarian 
workshops in preventive health related topics.  By 2012, Oportunidades has expanded 
its scope to more than 5.8 million households (Sedesol, 2014), and it is estimated to 
transfer over 1.1 billion U.S dollars per year to families in both rural and urban areas 
(Sedesol, 2012) representing a substantial source of income for the poor (IFPRI, 2013). 
 
Since its origins, the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program has been exposed to 
several evaluations with, overall, good results; Oportunidades has demonstrated to be an 
efficient strategy to increase the use of education and health services in Mexico 
(Schultz, 2004), (Behrman, 2000, 2001), (Skoufias, 2001), to reduce child labor 
(Skoufias, 2006), and to improve the nutritional status of its participants (Attanazio and 
Angelucci, 2009). However, there have not been many studies evaluating the impact of 
Oportunidades on the work incentives of its participants; particularly, the literature of 
the impact of the program on labor supply decisions of the indigenous rural population 
is practically inexistent.  
 
Inferring about this relation is important because according to the operational rules of 
the program, Oportunidades is a human development instrument that under its design’s 
logic, when the capabilities in education and heath of those living in poverty are 
fostered “incentives are generated for the participants to overcome, self-sufficiently, 
their precarious situation and then become able to access better levels of living 
standards” (Sedesol, 2012).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The minimum wellbeing line is the monetary value of the basic basket of food per person (CONEVAL, 
2014) that in the case of urban and rural areas is US$91.82 and $65.5 respectively. 
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Thus, the present research evaluates whether Oportunidades creates positive incentives 
for its rural participants to overcome their own situation or if it rather creates the 
unwanted outcome of people working less and becoming dependent on the transfers, a 
situation that would reduce the likelihood of the program alleviating poverty in the 
short-term. 
 
This question becomes relevant in a country in which 43% of the total non-indigenous 
and 72% (almost three out of every four persons) of the indigenous population still 
faces some sort poverty and where 62% and 21% of the total rural population lives 
below the Well-Being Line2 (WL) and in extreme poverty respectively, double in 
proportion compared to urban areas; In real numbers, 5.8 million of rural Mexicans live 
below the Minimum Well-Being Line (Coneval, 2012).  
 
The research exploits the current design of the program (there are eligible households 
that due to budgetary limitations are not treated yet) and the National Household Survey 
of Income and Expenditures (ENIGH) - that contains a rich set of variables related to 
the program participation and labor market outcomes- to conduct a Propensity Score 
Matching methodology that helps to overcome potential selection bias, and permits to 
estimate the effects of CCT on the time spent on productive activities (the intensive 
margin) and on the likelihood of participating in the labor market (the extensive market) 
for different groups of the population such as men, women, indigenous, non-indigenous 
in rural areas of Mexico. 
 
Under this framework, the probability of participating in Oportunidades given observed 
characteristics (variables used by Sedesol to select potential candidates) was predicted 
and used as an identification strategy. The Propensity Score allowed to match treated 
and untreated individuals with the same probability of receiving the transfers. 
Therefore, for those observations in the common support region, after testing for the 
balancing assumption, the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) was 
estimated using different matching algorithms; the Nearest Neighbor Matching without 
and with replacement techniques and the Caliper Radius as a robustness check. As a 
result, the study found no statistically significant effects of the CCT on the labor supply 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The Well-Being Line is the monetary value of the basic basket of food, and basic goods and services, 
while the Minimum Well-Being Line is only the value of the basic basket of food (Coneval, 2012).  	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of participating rural adults, neither on indigenous nor on non-indigenous men and 
women.  
 
Since the estimated ATET is not statistically significant, the hypothesis that 
Oportunidades creates dependency, at least income dependency, on their participants 
can be rejected. Therefore, the fact that poverty has not been substantially reduced in 
rural areas is not because the program is creating counter incentives to engage in 
productive activities nor that participants reduce their time dedicated to work when they 
receive the transfer but rather because of other determinants that go further to the scope 
of the present research. 
 
The main contribution of this research is that it presents a more profound analysis of the 
causal relation between a CCT program and labor supply disaggregated by ethnicity. 
Although in Mexico 7% of the population speaks one of the native ethnic languages, 
26% consider themselves as indigenous3, and are the most vulnerable group (specially 
the indigenous women), they have been systematically excluded from previous analysis 
dealing with the relation between Oportunidades and working incentives. Thus, 
including them and being able to test if the program creates incentives for them to work 
less, making them dependent on the transfers, has a great value both in terms of research 
and for the strategic design of the program. 
  
The paper is divided in 8 sections. Section 1 gives a program description; section 2 
reviews the literature; section 3 describes the mechanisms in which the transfers are 
expected to create incentives to re-allocate time between leisure and labor; Section 4 
introduces the data used and its benefits; Section 5 goes over the methodology and 
model used to estimate the causal relation; Section 6 presents the results and the ATET 
of the program; Section 7 entitles the limitations and potential sources of bias; and 
section 8 draws the conclusions and the policy implication of the present research.  
1.	  Program	  description	  	  
 
The national wide program “Oportunidades” aims to foster the development of 
capabilities associated with education, health, and nutrition of the Mexican population 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Estimations made by the author using the ENIGH 2012	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living below the Minimum Wellbeing Line (the monthly monetary value of the basic 
basket of food) for them to be able to break the inter-generational cycle of poverty 
(Sedesol, 2012). In order to achieve its objectives, it provides monetary transfers to 
women conditional on children attending to school (maintaining school attendance rate 
greater or equal to 85% is a condition), visiting periodically health clinics, and attending 
communitarian workshops in preventive health topics.  
 
The amount of the transfers depends on the number and gender of the offspring, and the 
educational level that they are attending; giving higher amounts to those families in 
which the children are going to upper levels of the educational system. Additionally, the 
households receive a bi-monthly monetary transfer (See appendix A) that aims to 
contribute to the improvement of the quantity and quality of the family’s food intake 
(Sedesol, 2012). 
 
In order to identify the households that are eligible to participate in the program the 
Ministry of Social Development –Sedesol- conducts a two stage process: in the first 
stage, the communities are selected based on the Social Marginalization Index 
constructed by the National Board of Population -CONAPO4-, and on the Index of 
Social Backwardness established by the National Board of Evaluation of the 
Development Policy –CONEVAL-. Once the localities are chosen, Sedesol conducts a 
survey, in the selected communities, on socio-economic information to identify target 
households. The information collected is then used to estimate the income per capita of 
the households; those whose income per capita is below the WBL are eligible.  Thus, 
the process of identifying the candidate families is divided into two stages: 1) 
identification of the localities, and 2) Focalization of the families. 
 
According to Sedesol (2012), when the households are identified, the program gives 
special priority 1) to households in which the per capita income is below the WBL and 
have members younger than 22 years, and to 2) Households in which the income is 
below the WBL and have women in their reproductive ages. Furthermore, when there 
are households already participating into the program, in order to be eligible to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  This marginality index contained the proportion of illiterate population, the proportion of adults working 
in the agricultural sector, and the proportion of houses without access to water, without a sewage system, 
without electricity, or with dirt flooring. 	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continue, their per capita income should persist under the WBL. 
 
The focalization of the program is large in rural areas, 3.4 million people5. However, 
there are still households that even though are eligible (they filled the criteria), they are 
not part of the program; those families are later incorporated according to the budget 
disposal of the Ministry of Social Development (Sedesol, 2012).  
 
This budgetary limitation is key in the design of the present research because it allows 
to identify individuals that have similar characteristics to the participants but do not 
receive the transfer; Hence, mimicking a counterfactual to estimate the effect is feasible 
using a data set that contains enough characteristics of the households and in which 
identifying those who participate into the program is possible, which is the case of the 
National Household Survey of Income and Expenditures (ENIGH) conducted by the 
INEGI in 2012.  
2.	  Literature	  review	  and	  contribution	  	  
Oportunidades has been deeply evaluated with considerably good results; the CCTs 
have proven to be an efficient strategy to increase the use of education and health 
services in Mexico (Schultz, 2004), (Behrman, 2000, 2001), (Skoufias, 2001), to reduce 
child labor (Skoufias, 2006), and to improve the nutritional status of its participants 
(Attanazio and Angelucci, 2009). 
 
However, the literature of the impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs on labor 
supply, while growing, is still limited (Teixeira, 2008). Among the programs in which 
the relation between CCT and labor supply has been more evaluated is the Brazilian 
Bolsa Familia (BF) that targets families living below the poverty line. According to 
Soares, Rivas, and Osorio (2010), the transfers caused an increase in labor participation 
rates for both men and women, finding a greater effect in the later. Moreover, Texeira 
(2008), using a propensity score method, estimates that “the program marginally 
diminishes the supply of weekly work hours of working adults” and has non-effect on 
the probability of working, and Foguel and Barros (2010) found no statistically 
significance on the impact of BF on labor supply.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Sedesol (2012)	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Although the Brazilian version of CCT has been the most evaluated regarding labor 
supply, there have been other programs in which this relation has been also tested. For 
example, Borraz and Gonzales (2009) used a propensity score matching to evaluate the 
impact of the Uruguayan CCT program “Ingreso Ciudadano6” in urban areas of 
Montevideo; they found significant negative effects of the program on the amount of 
hours worked per week – women reduced 17% while men 5% less hours-. Moreover, 
“Chile Solidario” (CS) that targets indigent households to whom transfers are given 
conditional only on participation in the program, was evaluated, during its first two 
years of implementation, by Galasso (2009) who found no statistically significant 
evidence of CS affecting the labor decisions of its participants. 
 
There have been also evaluations focused on the relation between CCT and incentives 
to work conducted in Central America. In Nicaragua, the program “Red de Protección 
Social” (RPS) that targets poor households in rural areas was evaluated, using an 
experimental analysis – randomized at the community level-, by Maluccio (2007).  He 
estimated that RPS has statistically significant negative effects on labor supply for 
participant families, being the most negatively impacted those who are engaged in 
agricultural activities. Furthermore, the Honduras’ “Programa de Asignación Familiar” 
(PAF), has been estimated to have no statistically significant effects on adult labor 
supply of adult women but creates very small negative disincentives for males  (Galiani, 
2012). 
 
There have been also some studies focused on Mexico. Skoufias (2000, 2006, and 2010) 
found no effect on the labor supply of the participants. However, they did not account 
for heterogeneity effects or whether Oportunidades impacts labor supply decisions 
differently to different groups of participants based on ethnicity.  
 
After reviewing the different efforts to estimate the impact of CCT programs on the 
participant’s decisions to supply labor, it is not clear whether they create positive, 
negative, or zero effects at all on labor participation; "The base for CCT's impact on 
adult labor participation is much weaker and less consistent than for child labor" 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The Ingreso Ciudadano was implemented between April 2005 and December 2007, its target 
population was people belonging to the first quintile of those below the poverty line (Borraz and 
Gonzalez, 2009)	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(Kabeer et al, 2012) and none of them have estimated the impact based on ethnicity. 
 
Therefore, the key contribution of this paper with respect to the ones mentioned above 
is that it considers the impact of social protection on native populations (an approach 
that non of the others papers have done so far), which allows for a more detailed 
investigation on the causal relation between Oportunidades and labor supply. Including 
this group in the analysis becomes relevant in a country in which 7% of the population 
speaks one of the indigenous languages and 26% consider themselves as indigenous7 
and that has the highest rates of poverty among all -72% face some sort of poverty, and 
31% live in a situation of extreme poverty8-.  
3.	  Mechanism:	  relation	  between	  CCT	  and	  allocation	  of	  time	  
 
The research is centered on the impact of the CCT given by Oportunidades on the labor 
supply decisions of its rural participants. The estimation of the effect is based on a 
microeconomic labor supply model that provides a useful framework on how 
individuals choose between spending more hours of his days on labor remunerating 
activities to be able to afford a greater bundle of goods and services or supply less labor 
and consume a greater amount of leisure; it is a model that represents the decision 
between time devoted to domestic activities and labor time.  
 
According to a simple microeconomic model of time allocation, individuals choose the 
amount of consumption and leisure according to their preferences (1) and their budget 
constraint (2) (Becker, 1976); the time allocation decision between working and leisure 
is a function of wage earned, non-work income, market prices and the household’s 
production function (Ashenfelter & Heckman, 1971), see equation 3. Where 𝑝 is the 
market price of consumption goods, 𝐶  represents all the goods that the consumer 
consumes, 𝑤 is the wage rate, 𝑙 is the total time spent in leisure activities, 𝑀 expresses 
all the non-labor income (transfers, remittances, child labor, etc.), and 𝐿 is the total 
amount of labor supplied.  Thus any exogenous shock affecting any of these elements 
may cause a new allocation of time that would affect the behavior of the individuals. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Estimations made by the author using the Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares 
(ENIGH) 2012  
8 According to the “Informe de Pobreza en Mexico” published by CONEVAL in 2012	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𝑈 = 𝑓(𝑙,𝐶)                                  (1) 𝑝𝐶 + 𝑤𝑙 = 𝑀 + 𝑤𝐿                     (2) 𝐿! = 𝐿!(𝑤! ,𝑝,𝑀)                          (3) 
 
 
Hence, the individuals combine market goods and time to produce a set of commodities 
that maximize their utility (Gronau, 2003). In this sense, by increasing their time 
allocated into leisure, time spent in household activities that generate products they 
consume such as cooking, the individuals are also boosting their utility even by 
maintaining the same level of consumption of market goods and services.  
 
In the case of the CCTs, Oportunidades in this specific case, the transfer represents a 
positive income shock, or a change in the non-labor income, 𝑀, that in turn modifies the 
individual’s relative value of time and a new allocation between paid work and leisure 
should be established (Texeira, 2008). When 𝑀 increases via a welfare transfer, the 
individual can consume the same amount of 𝐶 and still be able to reduce the labor, 𝐿, 
she supplies. Since leisure can be assumed to be a normal good, as the individuals 
increase their income, it is expected that they also increase their demand for leisure. 
 
According to the standard model, the transfer represents a pure income effect (Foguel & 
Barros, 2010); as households receive the transfer, their budget constraints shifts, 
allowing them to increase their leisure, reduce their labor supply, and still be able to 
consume the same basket of goods and services, 𝐶. Under this particular context, 
individuals who participate in Oportunidades and receive a positive shock of non-labor 
income may face disincentives to work, responding either by reducing their amount of 
time allocated into working hours or, in extreme cases, renouncing to their remunerated 
labor activities.  
 
On the other hand, a substitution effect is also expected. Under this case, the program’s 
conditionality of children going to school may reduce child labor and consequently the 
children’s contribution to the total household income would diminish 𝑀. In response to 
this, adult labor supply should be expected to rise in order to compensate and still able 
to consume the same basket of goods as before.  It could be the case that both income 
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and substitution effects move in opposite directions causing them to cancel each other 
(Parker, 2006). 
 
Thus, the effect of an increase in non-labor income on the labor supply of the 
participants is ambiguous and it would depend on the strength of the substitution and 
income effects; the first would increase the amount of hours worked while the later 
would reduced them. 
 
Additionally, as other members of the community get the treatment and everyone is 
well informed on the criterion that determines the access to Oportunidades, some non-
treated individuals may adjust their behavior in order to increase their likelihood to 
receive the transfer; “it is possible that some adults choose to work less, or not work at 
all so as to meet the income eligibility criterion of the program” (Foguel & Barros, 
2010) or that the conditionalities of the program to comply with periodic visits to the 
clinics may also decline the labor supply of some members of the household, most 
likely the women. Thus, there could be three mechanisms in which Oportunidades may 
affect the labor supply of the individuals: through the income effect, the substitution 
effect, or via the willing of being part of the program.  
  
However, not every individual’s decision of time allocation is expected to be impact 
with the same strength by an increase in the non-labor income; not all the participants 
are expected to react uniformly to the transfer. Since the program is thought and 
designed to alleviate poverty in the long run, it is relevant to study how incentives to 
work are affected to people with different characteristics based on ethnicity and gender.  
 
Estimating the impact of Oportunidades on the labor supply of different sub-groups is 
relevant to learn whether the program creates long-term income dependency on the 
participants or not, a question that is relevant to understand the efficiency of the CCT in 
breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty in Mexico.  
4.	  Data	  
 
The main source of data used in this research is the Mexican National Survey for 
Household Income and Expenditures (ENIGH 2012), which is conducted bi-annually, 
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since 1992 by the National Institute of Statistic and Geography (INEGI). It has a 
national geographical coverage at the rural and urban levels, contains micro data on the 
amount, structure, and distribution of income and expenditures of the households, and 
information about education, government transfers, family composition, and the 
economic activity of every member of the household members 
  
Since the design of the ENIGH is probabilistic and stratified, every observation has a 
different probability of being sampled; therefore, each household is selected to represent 
a different number of households in the population. For that reason, to ensure that each 
sub-group is properly represented, when the survey is used to estimate statistics of the 
total population, it is necessary to weight the sample data. “The weights are usually 
developed in a series of stages to compensate for unequal selection probabilities, 
nonresponse, non-coverage, and sampling fluctuations from known population values”  
(Brick and Kalton, 1996). Therefore, if sample means or percentages are calculated 
without weighting, the results will be biased estimates of the population. To undo this 
bias, it is needed to calculate weighted averages to correct for the sample design and be 
able to obtain unbiased estimates (Deaton, 1997).  The ENIGH 2012 contains an inflator 
factor, which is the inverse of the probability of being selected, that is used for the data 
to have representation at the national level. 
 
Thus, the use of the weights allows the observations to be representative of the 
population or a household in the survey to proxy a large numbers of households in the 
population, and each observation has to be multiplied by the inflation factor, to estimate 
the total statistics of household with similar characteristics. If this is not done “simple 
means will be biased estimators of population means” (Deaton, 1997). 
 
Although the ENIGH2012 only contains data about households once the program has 
been implemented and individuals were already treated (it is not possible to observe 
pre-treatment characteristics), it includes a rich set of variables related to program 
participation and labor market outcomes; additionally, those who receive the transfer 
and those who does not participate into the program come from the same data source 
(the same survey was used for both), all the variables of interest are measured and 
constructed in the same way for both, and are drown from the same labor markets. All 
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these conditions are crucial for the matching estimators to have a low bias (Smith & 
Todd, 2005). 
 
Since the research is focused on the labor supply decisions of the rural population, the 
sample was restricted for individuals between 15 and 64 years old that live in localities 
with 2,500 or less inhabitants. Additionally, the causal effect of Oportunidades is only 
estimated for the head and spouse of the household. After these data restrictions, the 
total sample size was reduced from 33,736 to 4,588 (an estimated rural population, after 
weighting, of 9,621,290).  
 
Moreover and since ethnicity is a multidimensional and ambiguous concept that 
includes a variety of characteristics such as origin, culture, race, religion, minority 
status, tribe, language, or various combinations of these concepts (United Nations, 
2008), and in order to avoid difficulties, the present study identifies indigenous as those 
who in the survey recognize themselves as indigenous9. 
 
Additionally, in order to test the causal effect of the CCTs on the labor supply decisions, 
the participants of Oportunidades are identified as those who declare to receive a 
transfer from the program; the labor supply variables are: a dummy indicating if the 
person works, and the amounts of hours worked per week.  
5.	  Methodology	  	  
5.1	  Potential	  Outcome	  framework	  
 
Since the research is interested on what is the heterogeneous impact of Oportunidades 
on the labor supply decisions of those who receive the program in rural areas, it is 
necessary to establish a model that allows inferring the causal effect of the program on 
the individuals’ behavior. For that matter the potential outcome framework is proposed.  
 
Basically, the matter of interest is to know ∆!= 𝑌!! − 𝑌!", how much the labor supply of 
an individual is affected by participating in Oportunidades; what might have happened 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The ENIGH, 2012 includes the question: According with your traditions, do you consider yourself an 
indigenous person? Thus, the present research consider indigenous to those who responded “yes” to that 
question  
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to someone who received the cash transfer if that person had not received it. 𝑌!! is the 
potential outcome if the person participated in the program and 𝑌!!  refers to the 
potential outcome of the same person i if she had not participated in Oportunidades. 
Thus, the causal effect of being treated would be the difference between 𝑌!! and 𝑌!!. 
However, it is only possible to observe one potential outcome at a time because the 
person only lives one life and she is either treated or not. In order to solve this problem, 
one solution is to compute the average effects of those treated and non-treated as in 
equation 4 (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). 
 
 𝐸 𝑌! 𝐷! = 1 − 𝐸 𝑌! 𝐷! = 0  = 𝐸 𝑌!! 𝐷! = 1 − 𝐸[𝑌!!|𝐷! = 1]                (4) 
                                                + 𝐸[𝑌!!|𝐷! = 1]−   𝐸[𝑌!!|𝐷! = 0]    
 
 
However, equation 4 expresses a naive comparison of averages by treatment status 
which does not tell us anything about potential outcomes; by doing this, the observable 
effect 𝐸 𝑌! 𝐷! = 1 − 𝐸 𝑌! 𝐷! = 0  is divided into two: 𝐸 𝑌!! 𝐷! = 1 − 𝐸[𝑌!!|𝐷! = 1] 
which is the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) and 𝐸  [𝑌!!|𝐷! = 1]   −  𝐸  [𝑌!!|𝐷! = 0] that reflects the selection bias. The first captures the difference in 
outcomes for those who received the program to their potential outcome if they had not 
being part of the program 𝐸  [𝑌!!|𝐷! = 1]. While the second part of the equation 𝐸[𝑌!!|𝐷! = 1]−   𝐸[𝑌!!|𝐷! = 0] is known as the selection bias, the difference between 
potential outcomes of those who were treated if they had not being treated and the 
potential outcome as untreated of the ones who were actually non-treated. Maybe those 
who participate in the program would have different labor supply decisions than those 
not treated in the first place. Hence, the goal of this empirical economic research is to 
overcome this selection bias, and therefore be able to say something about the causal 
effect of a variable like 𝐷! on the labor supply decisions.  
 
Since Oportunidades is, in the present, non-randomized and the data used is not a panel, 
comparing the outcome means to those treated against the non-treated 𝑌! 𝐷! = 1 −𝐸 𝑌! 𝐷! = 0  would lead to a latent bias in which the potential outcomes of those two 
groups are not independent of treatment status. Therefore, a strategy to construct a good 
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counterfactual should be applied to make 𝐸 𝑌!! 𝐷! = 1 =   𝐸 𝑌!! 𝐷! = 0  as likely as 
possible and be able to calculate the causal effect. 
 
5.2	  Selection	  bias;	  means	  by	  status	  
 
In order to test whether the treatment and control groups share similar pre-treatment 
characteristics or not, a mean difference test, for indigenous and non-indigenous living 
in rural areas, was conducted to compare their characteristics in terms of intra 
household demographic characteristics, the average education of the head and spouse, 
the socio-economic region that they live in10, if they use wood or coal as a fuel to cook, 
some proxies for the amount of assets they own, the crowding index (the total people 
living in the dwelling divided by the amount of rooms used for sleeping), the 
demographic dependency ratio (children plus elder divided by adults in their productive 
years) the total amount of members younger than eighteen years old, whether the 
individuals speak a native language or not, and the number of adult women living in the 
dwelling. All these variables were taken from the model used by the Mexican Ministry 
of Development to estimate the income of the potential candidates and to evaluate 
whether they are candidates to receive the program or not (See appendix B).  
 
Tables 1 and 2 show the mean value of these observable variables for both rural 
indigenous and non-indigenous (men and women), who are either the household’s head 
or the spouse, by treatment status and the number of observations with the calculated 
population after using weights. In the case of the non-indigenous, among the women, 
only in two cases, the group’s means are not statistically different and for all the other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The socio-economic regions of Mexico were identified according to the division made by INEGI in 
which the 32 states of the country were grouped in 7 stratus that share similar educational, labor, housing, 
and other socio-economic indicators.  The states placed in a same group have, on average, similar 
characteristics; they are homogenous and have similar labor markets. Based on this, in strata 7 are placed 
the better-off states while those in strata 1 are the worse-off in terms of well-being, the aggrupation is the 
next: 
Region 1: Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Chiapas 
Region 2: San Luis Potosi, Hidalgo, Puebla, Veracruz, Tabasco, and Campeche 
Region 3: Durango, Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Michoacán, and Tlaxcala 
Region 4: Sinaloa, Nayarit, Colima, Queretaro, Estado de Mexico, Morelos, Yucatan, and Quintana Roo 
Region 5: Baja California Sur, Baja California Norte, Sonora, Chihuahua, and Tamaulipas 
Region 6: Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Jalisco, and Aguascalientes 
Region 7: Mexico City (it was excluded because it has non-rural observations) 	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socio-economic characteristics the treated ones can be considered to be worse off than 
the untreated; the first have, on average, lower years of formal education, live in regions 
with lower wellbeing indicators, most of them live in dwellings where wood is used as 
fuel to cook, their crowding index is higher, and their households have less light bulbs.  
 
Moreover, between the non-indigenous men, 42% receives Oportunidades, the untreated 
have on average 3.4 more years of formal schooling, 24% of the treated belong to the 
lowest socio-economic region against 5% of the non-participants, and on average those 
who receive the transfer have 0.65 more children. All the variables, but two, are 
statistically different across groups with different status; only the variables region 3 and 
whether the person speaks a native language are statistically non-different between 
groups. 
 
On the other hand, for those who consider themselves indigenous, 57% of the women 
participate in Oportunidades, the difference in years in education is lower than for the 
indigenous but still statistically significant, 41% of the treated belong to the lowest 
socio-economic region compared to only 23% of the untreated, 87% of those who 
receive the transfer use wood or oil to cook against only 45% of the untreated, and there 
is a large difference in the amount of observations who belong to the medium low 
socio-economic level. For this same population group, the treated and untreated men 
also have different means in every variable but in one. 
 
Thus, according to the ENIGH, the groups (treated and untreated) are not identical, at 
least in these observable characteristics. Those who are part of the program are on 
average less educated, have a higher demographic dependency index, belong to a lower 
socio economic level, more use wood or coal as a fuel to cook, and have less assets than 
those who do not take part into the program for both indigenous and non-indigenous.  
 
As it was expected, in both cases, those who receive the program are on average worse 
off in terms of these socio-economic characteristics and it is also relevant to comment 
that the indigenous population have less years of education, a higher proportion belong 
to the lowest socio economic level, and have higher dependency ratios within the 
households than the non-indigenous. Among all the subgroups, those who have the 
lowest indicators are the indigenous women. It is for these observable differences that 
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studying how the labor supply of different sub-groups of the population respond to the 
incentives created by the CCTs becomes relevant. 
 
Table 1. 
 
However, due to the differences between groups, it is plausible to believe that that there 
is some selection bias, 𝐸 𝑌!! 𝐷! = 1   ≠   𝐸 𝑌!! 𝐷! = 0 , and estimating the causal effect 
only by comparing the difference in outcomes by status, as in equation 4, would lead to 
bias estimations of the effect that Oportunidades has on labor supply decisions for both 
indigenous and non-indigenous men and women. 
 
Treated Control  difference Std.err t p>|t|
Head and spouse average years of formal education 4.495 7.508 -3.031*** -0.197 -15.41 0.00
Household's head age 45.579 42.976 2.693*** -0.68 3.961 0.00
Socio-economic region 6 0.060 0.130 -0.0708*** -0.016 -4.307 0.00
Socio-economic region 5 0.062 0.122 -0.0597*** -0.016 -3.704 0.00
Socio-economic region 4 0.140 0.219 -0.0785*** -0.021 -3.697 0.00
Socio-economic region 3 0.187 0.214 -0.0284 -0.022 -1.287 -0.20
Socio-economic region 2 0.325 0.260 0.0652*** -0.025 2.625 -0.01
Socio-economic region 1 0.226 0.055 0.172*** -0.018 9.667 0.00
Speaks a native language 0.010 0.015 -0.00475 -0.006 -0.765 -0.44
Fuel=1 if use wood or oil to cook 0.635 0.238 0.400*** -0.025 16.17 0.00
# of members younger than 18 years old 2.163 1.558 0.604*** -0.076 7.917 0.00
Demographic Dependency Ratio 0.887 0.755 0.130*** -0.037 3.534 0.00
Crowding Index 2.880 2.348 0.533*** -0.071 7.482 0.00
# of light bulbs in the dwelling 4.746 6.588 -1.847*** -0.225 -8.208 0.00
Microwave=1 if owns a microwave 0.133 0.363 -0.229*** -0.023 -9.787 0.00
Observations 563 801
Weight 1,226,518 1,645,680
Head and spouse average years of formal education 4.635 8.031 -3.429*** -0.204 -16.770 0.000
Household's head age 44.940 40.984 4.105*** -0.658 6.235 0.000
Socio-economic region 6 0.054 0.139 -0.0843*** -0.018 -4.697 0.000
Socio-economic region 5 0.064 0.128 -0.0629*** -0.018 -3.514 0.000
Socio-economic region 4 0.142 0.215 -0.0750*** -0.023 -3.246 -0.001
Socio-economic region 3 0.193 0.207 -0.0107 -0.024 -0.449 -0.653
Socio-economic region 2 0.309 0.257 0.0498* -0.027 1.865 -0.062
Socio-economic region 1 0.238 0.054 0.183*** -0.020 9.413 0.000
Speaks a native language 0.021 0.013 0.00743 -0.008 0.974 -0.330
Fuel=1 if use wood or oil to cook 0.636 0.216 0.419*** -0.026 15.840 0.000
# of members younger than 18 years old 2.262 1.606 0.653*** -0.083 7.838 0.000
Demographic Dependency Ratio 0.857 0.702 0.158*** -0.036 4.378 0.000
Crowding Index 2.976 2.418 0.554*** -0.079 7.027 0.000
# of light bulbs in the dwelling 4.676 6.653 -1.934*** -0.237 -8.163 0.000
Observations 475 690
Weight 1,043,491 1,426,743
Mean difference by treatment status
Non-indigenous women
Non-indigenous men
	  19	  	  
Table 2. 
 
5.3	  Alternative	  to	  solve	  the	  Conditional	  Independence	  Assumption	  (CIA)	  
 
Therefore, in order to estimate the causal effect of Oportunidades on the labor market 
decisions it is necessary to overcome the selection bias problem but as it was said 
above, we can only observe one individual at a time and a counterfactual should be 
constructed in order to make 𝐸 𝑌!! 𝐷! = 1 =   𝐸 𝑌!! 𝐷! = 0   and be then able to 
estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) and say something about 
how much the labor supply is affected, on average, for the persons who were selected 
into the program. One possibility to overcome the selection bias, or at least to reduce it, 
is the use of the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology that attempts to find 
non-participants who are similar to participants in all relevant pre-treatment observable 
characteristics in order to achieve the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA); 
Treated Control  difference Std.err t p>|t|
Head and spouse average years of formal education 4.353 6.533 -2.193*** -0.208 -10.560 0.000
Household's head age 46.255 41.641 4.638*** -0.777 5.971 0.000
Socio-economic region 6 0.018 0.063 -0.0397*** -0.011 -3.544 0.000
Socio-economic region 5 0.036 0.037 -0.00127 -0.012 -0.110 -0.912
Socio-economic region 4 0.100 0.182 -0.0843*** -0.021 -4.082 0.000
Socio-economic region 3 0.057 0.163 -0.107*** -0.018 -5.869 0.000
Socio-economic region 2 0.375 0.323 0.0512* -0.029 1.759 -0.079
Socio-economic region 1 0.413 0.232 0.181*** -0.028 6.433 0.000
Speaks a native language 0.599 0.262 0.339*** -0.029 11.900 0.000
Fuel=1 if use wood or oil to cook 0.872 0.454 0.421*** -0.025 16.790 0.000
# of members younger than 18 years old 2.193 1.664 0.526*** -0.095 5.530 0.000
Crowding Index 3.012 2.637 0.366*** -0.092 3.995 0.000
share bathroom with no access to water with other dwelling 0.433 0.620 -0.187*** -0.030 -6.261 0.000
Car=1 if someone in the household owns a car 0.021 0.143 -0.123*** -0.015 -7.992 0.000
Observations 654 470
Weight 1,353,951 998,385
Head and spouse average years of formal education 4.528 6.659 -2.105*** -0.218 -9.646 0.000
Household's head age 44.645 40.500 3.894*** -0.771 5.052 0.000
Socio-economic region 6 0.029 0.050 -0.0204 -0.013 -1.591 -0.112
Socio-economic region 5 0.036 0.038 -0.00376 -0.013 -0.299 -0.765
Socio-economic region 4 0.113 0.177 -0.0556** -0.023 -2.424 -0.016
Socio-economic region 3 0.050 0.173 -0.123*** -0.020 -6.168 0.000
Socio-economic region 2 0.360 0.346 0.0118 -0.032 0.367 -0.714
Socio-economic region 1 0.412 0.216 0.191*** -0.031 6.215 0.000
Speaks a native language 0.603 0.291 0.310*** -0.032 9.777 0.000
Fuel=1 if use wood or oil to cook 0.888 0.491 0.397*** -0.027 14.630 0.000
# of members younger than 18 years old 2.260 1.749 0.520*** -0.106 4.913 0.000
Demographic Dependency Ratio 0.863 0.726 0.136*** -0.041 3.314 -0.001
Crowding Index 3.072 2.744 0.344*** -0.103 3.327 -0.001
share bathroom with no access to water with other dwelling 0.450 0.630 -0.177*** -0.033 -5.392 0.000
Observations 542 393
Weight 1,112,563 811,467
Mean difference by treatment status
Indigenous women
Indigenous men
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making the potential outcomes independent of treatment assignment conditional on a 
vector of covariates 𝑋!(equation 5) that then allows to estimate differences among 
groups that can be attributed to the program. 
 (𝑌!! ,𝑌!!) ⊥ 𝐷!|𝑋!                                    (5) 
 
However, the ENIGH2012 is a considerable big data set that contains plenty of 
observable characteristics both at the household and at the individual level. Therefore, 
controlling for all relevant covariates is not feasible because “as the number of 
covariates increases linearly, the data demands increase geometrically (…) making it 
difficult to find controls with identical or near identical values on more than a small 
number of variables” (Smith, 1997). Thus, the CIA can be re-written as (𝑌!! ,𝑌!!) ⊥𝐷!|𝑝(𝑥)  where 𝑝 𝑥 = Pr 𝐷! = 1 𝑋! = 𝐸 𝐷! = 1 𝑋! . This is feasible because 
according to the propensity score theorem if potential outcomes are independent of 
treatment status conditional on covariates 𝑋! ,   then potential outcomes are also 
independent of treatment status conditional on a scalar function of covariates, the 
propensity score 𝑝(𝑥) (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). 
 
Under this framework, the probability of participating in Oportunidades given observed 
characteristics is estimated and used as an identification strategy. The Propensity Score 
ensures that there are treated and non-treated individuals with the same probability of 
being treated. Therefore, for those individuals that share the same probability of 
participating but have different treatment status, their potential outcomes can be 
assumed to be independent of treatment assignment conditional on the balancing score 𝑝(𝑥) if the other observable and unobservable covariates are also balanced (Caliendo, 
2005). 
 
Since the CIA requires that the potential outcomes must be independent of treatment 
status conditional on the propensity score, the PSM requires a set of variables ‘X’ that 
credibly satisfies this condition: “only variables that are unaffected by participation, or 
the anticipation of it, should be included to estimate the scores” (Caliendo, 2005). Since 
the variables should be relevant for determining treatment but not affected by 
Oportunidades, the propensity score was estimated using those variables that are used 
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for the program to select individuals and that are unlikely to be affected by treatment 
status.  
 
It is also relevant to mention that for the potential outcome to be independent of whether 
the individuals receive or not Oportunidades, the two groups most have statistically 
equal pre-treatment observable and unobservable characteristics, meaning that in order 
to create a valid counterfactual “the set of factors on which people are matched must be 
sufficiently comprehensive that there are no remaining differences between the 
treatment and comparison group that might be correlated with the outcome of interest” 
(Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013). In the case of the PSM, the groups are matched 
based only on observable characteristics so the distribution of unobservable 
characteristics could emerge as a concern to estimate the effect of the program; 
However, this research was realized having this potential source of bias in mind so the 
variables chosen to match are thought to reduce this potential source of statistical noise 
(See section 8).   
 
As the main interest of the research is to estimate how sensitive different sub-groups of 
the rural population are to a positive non-labor income shock (the transfer), the 
significant differences in socio-economic characteristics between rural men and women 
both indigenous and non-indigenous (shown in Section 5.2) must be taken in 
consideration when the probability of being treated is estimated. One alternative would 
be to include variables that control for all these differences; however, Heckman (1998) 
claims that the most efficient way to estimate heterogeneous effects is to conduct the 
matching steps separately for each demographic group and then test all the matching 
assumptions separately.   
 
5.4	  Base	  line	  estimations	  
 
In order to get some baseline estimates that are later helpful to compare with the 
matching estimates, a mean comparison in the labor supply measured in weekly hours 
spent in remunerated activities was conducted by treatment status. According to the 
ENIGH 2012, the non-indigenous women living in rural areas work on average 29.7 
hours a week but those who receive the transfer dedicate 9.8 less hours to these 
activities than the untreated ones. For the men of this subgroup, the average hours 
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worked per week is 46.5 and also the non-participants work less hours a week (although 
this difference is not statistically significant). 
 
In the case of those who declare being indigenous, the average weekly hours worked per 
week for females is 29.2 and for males 44.3. In both cases the treated individuals work, 
on average, less hours than those who do participate into the program; the difference is 
8.8 for females and 3.2 for males, both statistically significant. 
 
Table 3. 
 
Once the observable socio-economic characteristics are used as controls, the difference 
is reduced but still significant at least at the 90% level for both indigenous and non-
indigenous women, the first reduce their labor time by 14% and the later by 19%. Thus, 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
Oportunidades=1 if treated -9.827*** -4.333** -3.423 0.454 -8.798*** -5.679* -3.177* -0.486
(2.543) (2.180) (2.161) (1.843) (3.202) (3.186) (1.850) (2.005)
Head and spouse average years of formal education 0.777*** 0.190 0.00170
(0.278) (0.251) (0.341)
Household's head age -0.0558 -0.0337 0.0585 -0.279***
(0.0997) (0.108) (0.0923) (0.0662)
Socio-economic region 6 -4.954 -3.661 -8.214 0.570
(4.747) (2.970) (5.138) (7.641)
Socio-economic region 5 2.575 2.238 1.615 4.410*
(5.431) (2.967) (7.959) (2.264)
Socio-economic region 4 1.668 8.015*** -5.699 5.674**
(6.102) (2.269) (4.118) (2.319)
Socio-economic region 3 -4.785 4.106 -2.180 1.344
(4.413) (2.651) (4.837) (3.466)
Socio-economic region 2 -3.065 0.00424 -2.554 3.993*
(4.170) (2.496) (3.191) (2.273)
Speaks a native language -10.77** -0.190 -0.623 -0.525
(5.179) (4.551) (4.109) (2.088)
Fuel=1 if use wood or oil to cook -4.925* -5.236*** -9.843*** -2.502
(2.780) (1.457) (3.744) (2.325)
# of members younger than 18 years old 0.375 0.962 -0.158 1.992**
(1.042) (1.184) (0.972) (0.931)
Demographic Dependency Ratio 1.293 -1.360 -3.159
(2.232) (2.628) (2.334)
Crowding Index -1.557* -0.337 -1.222 -0.327
(0.859) (0.933) (1.222) (0.561)
# of light bulbs in the dwelling -0.437* 0.129
(0.256) (0.229)
Microwave=1 if owns a microwave 4.806
(2.958)
(7.446)
Average years of formal education 0.414
(0.285)
share bathroom with no access to water -2.313 2.241
(3.539) (2.007)
Car=1 if someone in the household owns a car -7.129*
(3.909)
# of women in reproductive age 1.296
(1.590)
Constant 34.67*** 37.71*** 48.19*** 45.98*** 33.61*** 40.03*** 45.99*** 53.94***
(1.978)
Observarions 562 552 984 959 549 549 804 804
Weights 1,202,896 1,176,492 2,099,029 2,045,950 1,147,788 1,147,788 1,650,849 1,650,849
R-squared 0.051 0.123 0.007 0.056 0.037 0.089 0.007 0.063
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Number of hours worked per week Number of hours worked per week
Base line estimates and regressions controlling for observable characteristics
Non-indigenous
Women Men
Indigenous
Women Men
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by only comparing the impact on labor supply using an OLS framework and not taking 
in consideration selection bias, the program seems to affect negatively the amount of 
time spent by women in remunerated activities but men are unaffected; after adding the 
control variables, the impact of the program on men is, in both cases, statistically 
insignificant.  
 
Nevertheless, a simple comparison of labor supply by treatment status lead to a biased 
estimation of the effect of the program (it was previously tested that 𝐸 𝑌!! 𝐷! = 1   ≠  𝐸 𝑌!! 𝐷! = 0 ) so we cannot take these results as unbiased or causal because we could 
still be facing a self-selection problem in which we can mistakenly conclude that 
Conditional Cash Transfers given to the rural poor have a negative impact on the 
amount of hours dedicated to work, which could be interpreted as an indicator of the 
program creating income dependency on the participants when it might be the case that 
does who do receive the transfer worked less in the first place. 
	  
5.5	  Estimation	  of	  the	  propensity	  scores	  
 
Therefore, a propensity score to reduced potential bias, was estimated using a probit 
model for indigenous and non-indigenous, men and women, separately, that regressed 
treatment status (a dummy that identifies participants) on variables that are assumed to 
remain unaffected by the program and that are also used by the Mexican Ministry of 
Social Development to estimate the per capita household income of the potential 
candidates -the Ministry estimates the income of potential participants through a series 
of socio-economic and demographic variables- (see appendix B). Thus, candidates for 
treatment are those whose estimated per capita household income stands below than the 
Minimum Well-Being Line (Sedesol, 2014). 
 
As a result of the probit model, every individual in the sample has an estimated 
probability of being treated given her observed characteristics and the comparison 
between groups with similar likelihood of participating, hypothetically, is feasible to be 
done; it has to kept in mind that the main purpose of estimating the propensity sore is 
not to predict selection into treatment as good as possible but to balance all covariates 
(Augurzky and Schmidt, 2000) 
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The outcomes of the probit model (See Appendix C) indicate that the average years of 
formal education and owning more assets, proxied by having a car or a microwave, 
decrease the probability of being treated for all the groups. On the other hand, the 
household’s head age, living in a dwelling where wood or oil is used to cook, and the 
number of members below eighteen years old increase it. An interesting outcome is that 
the socioeconomic regions are statistically significant for non-indigenous men and 
women (belonging to poorer socio-economic regions increase the probability of being 
treated) but not all them are significant for the indigenous population. These results are 
consistent with the criterion of the program and to the intuitive characteristics of the 
variables.   
5.6	  The	  overlap	  assumption	  	  
 
Once the propensity scores were estimated, the overlap assumption that states that for 
some values of the propensity score there are participants and non-participants with the 
same probability of being treated, 0 < Pr 𝐷! = 1 𝑝 𝑥! < 1, was tested. In order to 
visually examine if there are any insights of the overlapping assumption, the 
histograms, for all groups, of the probability of being treated given the observable 
characteristics were inspected (See graphic 1).  
 
The histograms confirm that given the estimated propensity scores there is an overlap in 
the probability distribution between groups; for different values of the probability of 
participating in Oportunidades there are both treated and non-treated individuals, in all 
the four cases. Thus, the overlapping assumption seems to be fulfilled at the probability 
region [0.014, 0.99] for the non-indigenous women and at [0.005, 0.99] for the males of 
this group. Additionally, for the indigenous women and men the common support 
regions are [0.036,0.99] and [0.038, 0.98] respectively. 
 
Therefore, in order to reduce the difference in potential outcomes between groups and 
to construct a more efficient counterfactual, 𝐸 𝑌!! 𝐷! = 1 , the sample was restricted to 
those regions for each one of the population’s sub-groups. By doing that, the potential 
bias in the estimation of the causal effect between Oportunidades and labor supply has 
been hypothetically reduced (at least in observable characteristics).  
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Graphic 1. 
 
Although there is a common support region for all groups, it is clear that the propensity 
score distributions are dissimilar between those who receive and not receive 
Oportunidades. In the case of the indigenous, most of the treated observations are 
placed on the right of the distribution while the untreated are located on the left; many 
treated have a high probability of being treated but few untreated have those values of 𝑝 𝑥! . On the other hand, the distributions for the non-indigenous (both men and 
women) are more evenly distributed for the treated but most of the untreated have low 
probabilities of being part of Oportunidades. Thus, while there is a common support 
region, it is relevant to take into account these differences in distributions when the 
causal effects are estimated later on.   
5.7	  Balancing	  tests	  	  
Additionally, in order to test if the CIA holds, once the overlap in the probability 
distribution between groups has been proved, the covariates ‘𝑋’ should be balanced for 
treated and untreated observations. For that matter, to estimate the difference in means 
by status, the data set was restricted to the area of common support for all the groups 
and t-tests were conducted to prove that they are balanced; if there are no statistical 
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significant difference between means, the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
(ATET) could be estimated 𝐴𝑇𝑇!"# = 𝐸! ! |!!!{𝐸 𝑌 1 𝐷 = 1,𝑝 𝑥 − 𝐸 𝑌 0 𝐷 = 0,𝑝 𝑥 }  that in words is 
simply the mean difference in outcomes over the common support area (Caliendo, 
2005). 
 
Table 4. 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the t-test for differences between control and treatment 
groups within the common support region (see appendix D for the t-test of indigenous). 
If the common support assumption was fulfilled, observations in both groups should be 
very similar and no systematic differences should be observed.  According to the tests, 
Variable Treated Control Difference t-test p>t
Head and spouse average years of formal education 5.245 4.967 0.278 0.87 0.386
Household's head age 45.551 44.738 0.813 0.78 0.438
Socio-economic region 6 0.042 0.079 -0.037 -1.62 0.106
Socio-economic region 5 0.051 0.093 -0.042 -1.68 0.094
Socio-economic region 4 0.201 0.122 0.079 2.24 0.025
Socio-economic region 3 0.215 0.280 -0.065 -1.57 0.117
Socio-economic region 2 0.336 0.313 0.023 0.52 0.607
Socio-economic region 1 0.154 0.112 0.042 1.28 0.201
Speaks a native language 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.58 0.563
Fuel=1 if use wood or oil to cook 0.607 0.565 0.042 0.88 0.378
# of members younger than 18 years old 1.841 2.042 -0.201 -1.38 0.167
Demographic Dependency Ratio 0.817 0.879 -0.061 -0.85 0.393
Crowding Index 2.639 2.742 -0.103 -0.73 0.465
# of light bulbs in the dwelling 4.879 4.692 0.187 0.77 0.443
Microwave=1 if owns a microwave 0.168 0.229 -0.061 -1.58 0.116
Car=1 if someone in the household owns a car 0.093 0.150 -0.056 -1.78 0.076
# of women in reproductive age 1.341 1.257 0.084 1.1 0.271
Variable Treated Control Difference t-test p>t
Head and spouse average years of formal education 5.459 5.069 0.390 1.73 0.084
Household's head age 44.402 44.884 -0.482 -0.58 0.559
Socio-economic region 6 0.077 0.124 -0.047 -2.1 0.036
Socio-economic region 5 0.080 0.096 -0.017 -0.78 0.433
Socio-economic region 4 0.185 0.198 -0.014 -0.47 0.638
Socio-economic region 3 0.264 0.237 0.028 0.86 0.393
Socio-economic region 2 0.281 0.273 0.008 0.25 0.804
Socio-economic region 1 0.113 0.072 0.041 1.93 0.055
Speaks a native language 0.022 0.036 -0.014 -1.11 0.269
Fuel=1 if use wood or oil to cook 0.556 0.584 -0.028 -0.75 0.454
# of members younger than 18 years old 2.055 2.121 -0.066 -0.64 0.52
Demographic Dependency Ratio 0.788 0.866 -0.078 -1.74 0.082
Crowding Index 2.739 2.881 -0.142 -2.25 0.451
# of light bulbs in the dwelling 4.719 4.606 0.113 0.61 0.545
Microwave=1 if owns a microwave 0.182 0.215 -0.033 -1.12 0.265
Car=1 if someone in the household owns a car 0.094 0.138 -0.044 -1.86 0.064
# of women in reproductive age 1.320 1.298 0.022 0.35 0.725
Mean
Balancing test: Mean diffrence by treatment status within the common support region
Non-indigenous women 
Mean
Non-indigenous men 
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it can be assumed that the balancing property was achieved and that potential selection 
bias has been systematically reduced; every difference in means in the socio-economic 
characteristics is not statistically significant at the 5% level, and for the variables that 
control for different regions of the country there are no general differences between 
groups. Thus, estimating the ATET of Oportunidades on the labor supply decision 
seems feasible at least within the common support region. 
6.	  Estimation	  of	  the	  impact	  
 
Since the common support and the CIA assumptions have been fulfilled, it could be 
assumed that the treatment and control groups, after “trimming” the data, are on average 
statistically identical on the observable covariates; the potential bias has been 
significantly reduced and the ATET could be estimated using the created counterfactual 
without the need to control for any other variable (See section 7 for limitations).  
 
In the regression model, the labor supply decision is measured with the probability of 
working (the extensive margin) and the weekly hours worked (the intensive margin) 
while the non-labor income shock is expressed as dummy that identifies those who 
receive a CCT from the program. In order to measure the heterogeneous effects and the 
sensitivity of the impact caused by the positive income shock, an identical regression 
was run for each one of the four groups (indigenous/non-indigenous, men/women) 
where the coefficient of interest is the one that identifies the treatment status. 
 𝐿! = ß! + ß!𝑇! + 𝑢!                  (6) 
 
Where 𝐿! is the weekly hours worked, 𝑇! is a dummy that identifies the Oportunidades’ 
participants. The coefficient of interest is ß!,  which is the Average Treatment Effect of 
the Treated, the mean difference in outcomes (labor supply) between control and treated 
individuals in the common support area. In the case of the extensive margin a similar 
model is estimated with the difference that the dependent variable is a dummy variable 
that identifies whether the individual works or not. Thus a model, identical to equation 6 
is estimated with the only difference that the ß! coefficient estimates the ATET of 
Oportunidades on the probability of working.  
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The relevance of running separate regressions for each one of the groups, is that it 
allows estimating heterogeneous effects, meaning that it serves to know whether 
different groups of the population respond differently to the transfer.  
 
Since the distribution of the propensity scores is different by treatment status for all 
groups (there are a lot of treated individuals with high probability of being treated and 
vice versa for the untreated), the ATET estimators would differ depending on how the 
matching neighborhood is defined. The first alternative is to match a person who 
receives Oportunidades with the closest untreated in terms of propensity scores (see 
equation 7). This is known as nearest neighbor matching (NN) without replacement11. 
 𝐶 𝑃! = 𝑚𝑖𝑛! ∥ 𝑃! − 𝑃! ∥, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐼!                  (7) 
 
 However, if matching without replacement is done, the chances of potential bias would 
increase because a treated person with high propensity score would be, most likely, 
matched to a comparison with low propensity score (Smith & Todd, 2005), meaning 
that two individuals with different characteristics and therefore dissimilar potential 
outcomes are compared leading to bias estimations of the effect of the program on labor 
supply. 
 
Nevertheless, and in order to overcome this potential bias problem, a person who is part 
of the untreated group could be used more than once for matching purposes. This later 
approach, known as nearest neighbor matching with replacement, increases the quality 
of the matching but reduces the amount of observation used. Thus, there is a trade-off 
between bias and the estimator variance 
 
Table 5 presents the ATET estimates, on the intensive margin, using different methods. 
The first row of every group shows the estimated impact of Oportunidades on the 
participant’s hours worked per week by only comparing means between treatment 
statuses within each group’s common support region. When this method is used, the 
estimated impact is negative and statistically significant for all the groups except for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Following Smith and Todd (2005): 𝐶 𝑃!  defines the neighborhood for each 𝑖 in the sample, 𝑃! is the 
propensity score of a treated observation, 𝑃!  for an untreated one, and 𝐼! expresses the set of non-
participants.	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indigenous men. The most sensitive group, according to these estimates is the one of the 
indigenous women that by participating into the program reduce their hours worked 
27%, on average.  
 
Table 5. 
 
 
However, these estimates could not be taken as causal because even within the common 
support region there can be significant differences in the comparison groups; the 
distributions are uneven and a person with high probability could be compared with one 
with low likelihood of participating. Thus, the nearest neighbor approach with no 
replacement and replacement were also estimated. According to these two matching 
strategies, the Conditional Cash Transfer (the positive income shock) has no statistically 
significant impact in neither of the groups –except for the indigenous women that have 
a negative impact using the NN without replacement- and we saw in the previous 
ATET S.E t-statistic treated untreated
Mean Comparison without matching -6.58 1.85 -3.56 214 327
Nearest-Neighbor Matching without replacement -3.332 2.07 -1.61 214 214
Nearest-Neighbor Matching with replacement -4.23 3.3 -1.28 214 327
Caliper Radius (0.1) -5.13 2.62 -1.96 214 327
Caliper Radius (0.01) -2.94 2.75 -1.07 188 327
Caliper Radius (0.001) -0.97 3.44 -0.28 91 327
Mean Comparison without matching -4.53 1.34 -3.38 363 568
Nearest-Neighbor Matching without replacement -2.71 1.54 -1.76 363 363
Nearest-Neighbor Matching with replacement -3.79 2.51 -1.51 363 568
Caliper Radius (0.1) -3.56 1.88 -1.89 363 568
Caliper Radius (0.01) -3.24 2.11 -1.54 346 568
Caliper Radius (0.001) -0.64 2.33 -0.27 193 568
Non-indigenous women
Non-indigenous men
Intensive Margin. Estimation of the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated using different matching methods
ATET S.E t-statistic treated untreated
Mean Comparison without matching -7.35 1.91 -3.85 211 211
Nearest-Neighbor Matching without replacement -7.88 2.21 -3.56 211 211
Nearest-Neighbor Matching with replacement -3.55 3.43 -1.04 320 211
Caliper Radius (0.1) -4.85 2.75 -1.76 320 211
Caliper Radius (0.01) -3.42 2.98 -1.14 311 211
Caliper Radius (0.001) -0.1 3.48 -0.03 100 211
Mean Comparison without matching -2.63 1.28 -2.05 476 341
Nearest-Neighbor Matching without replacement -1.84 1.42 -1.3 341 341
Nearest-Neighbor Matching with replacement -2.45 2.32 -1.06 476 341
Caliper Radius (0.1) -1.86 1.71 -1.09 476 341
Caliper Radius (0.01) -1.13 1.93 -0.59 476 341
Caliper Radius (0.001) -0.13 2.35 -0.06 476 341
Indigenous women
Indigenous men
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section that these results can be more accurate because selection bias was, assumed, to 
been reduced significantly by improving the matching quality. 
 
Whereas allowing replacement has reduced the bias, it is still necessary to test for the 
quality of the matching and the potential bias that might arise by using matches that are 
far away from each other in the distribution. Thus, a radius approach was conducted in 
which a maximum propensity score distance (𝜏)  was imposed for comparability 
reasons. 
 𝐶 𝑃! =  ∥ 𝑃! − 𝑃! ∥  <   𝜏  , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐼!                 (8) 
  
Under this approach, if the difference in propensity scores of the nearest neighbor is 
higher that the desired radius (𝜏), those observations are not used for matching and are 
excluded from the analysis; only observations whose propensity score is sufficiently 
similar are compared to each other. Rows four, five, and six show the results using 𝜏 
=0.1 .01 and .001.  
 
The imposition of a radius causes the ATET estimates to decrease in magnitude (See 
rows 4,5, and 6 of table 5) –the smaller the radius, the lower the estimates and their 
significance-, and although there is a trade-off between bias and variance (when 
decreasing the radius, only very similar individuals are compared which reduces the 
bias but observations are lost as the radius becomes smaller) these outcome can be read 
as a test for the quality of the nearest neighbor matching. In this case there is a slight 
increase in the standard errors as 𝜏 shrinks and the magnitude and significance of the 
estimators is reduced as more similar individuals are compared; this supports the results 
of Oportunidades not affecting the labor supply decision, at the intensive margin, of the 
rural participants.  
 
Although, it has been estimated that the intensive margin is not affected by 
Oportunidades, it is still relevant to measure how the program impacts the actual 
decision of engaging in a remunerating labor activity. Thus, whether Oportunidades has 
an impact on the probability of working was also estimated for each one of the 
population sub-groups; Table 6, shows the ATET on the probability of working using 
the same algorithms that were used to estimate the impact on the intensive margin.  
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Table 6. 
 
 
As it can be seen in the results (table 6), there are no statistically significant differences 
in labor participation rates across treated and untreated individuals even after limiting 
the matching to the most rigorous specifications. The only group that has close to 
statistically significant difference is the one of the indigenous women; however, the 
direction of the impact, if there is one, is positive.  
 
Consequently, after reducing the original selection bias and comparing individuals that 
are assumed to have, on average, similar potential outcomes, it is feasible to conclude 
that Oportunidades does not create a non-labor income dependency on its participants, 
neither at the intensive nor at the extensive margin. At least not for indigenous and non-
indigenous men and women living in rural areas and the fact that poverty has not being 
ATET S.E t-statistic treated untreated
Mean Comparison without matching 0.03 0.28 0.96 505 788
Nearest-Neighbor Matching without replacement 0.04 0.31 1.27 505 505
Nearest-Neighbor Matching with replacement -0.15 0.05 -0.32 505 788
Caliper Radius (0.1) 0.16 0.04 0.43 505 788
Caliper Radius (0.01) 0.01 0.04 0.31 485 788
Caliper Radius (0.001) -0.01 0.43 -0.2 320 788
Mean Comparison without matching 0.02 0.01 1.6 411 683
Nearest-Neighbor Matching without replacement 0.02 0.018 1.3 411 411
Nearest-Neighbor Matching with replacement 0.02 0.03 0.73 411 683
Caliper Radius (0.1) 0.03 0.02 1.26 411 683
Caliper Radius (0.01) 0.03 0.02 1.44 396 683
Caliper Radius (0.001) 0 0.03 0.31 454 683
Extensive Margin. Estimation of the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated using different matching methods
Non-indigenous women
Non-indigenous men
ATET S.E t-statistic treated untreated
Mean Comparison without matching 0.11 0.03 3.53 470 470
Nearest-Neighbor Matching without replacement 0.08 0.03 2.5 470 470
Nearest-Neighbor Matching with replacement 0.07 0.05 1.37 640 470
Caliper Radius (0.1) 0.09 0.04 2.18 640 470
Caliper Radius (0.01) 0.1 0.04 2.25 621 470
Caliper Radius (0.001) 0.03 0.05 0.69 325 470
Mean Comparison without matching 0 0.01 -0.5 524 391
Nearest-Neighbor Matching without replacement 0 0.01 -0.34 391 391
Nearest-Neighbor Matching with replacement -0.02 0.02 -1.05 524 391
Caliper Radius (0.1) 0 0.02 -0.52 524 391
Caliper Radius (0.01) -0.01 0.02 -0.61 524 391
Caliper Radius (0.001) 0 0.02 -0.17 251 391
Indigenous women
Indigenous men
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reduced has not to do with the program creating counter incentives for people to engage 
in productive activities.  
7.	  Limitations	  	  	  
 
Although the process of inferring the causal effect that Oportunidades has on the labor 
supply decisions of its rural participants has been conducted following a rigorous 
Propensity Score Matching methodology, it is important to consider that there are still, 
both, data and methodological limitations to ensure that the results strictly represent an 
unbiased estimations of the impact. Having these in mind is necessary when the 
conclusions of the research are drawn. 
 
The first thing to consider is that at the present stages, Oportunidades does not assign 
treatment in a randomized way12. Hence, treated and untreated individuals are not 
necessarily statistically identical (as it was proved in section 5.2). Moreover, the 
ENIGH2012 (the data set used) collected data about households once the program has 
been implemented and individuals were already treated. Thus, it contains information 
about the levels of different variables in 2012 but pre-treatment characteristics are 
impossible to observe.  
 
It is because of these data and program design constraints that the present research 
attempted to mimic a counterfactual in order to know what would have happened to the 
labor supply of those who receive the transfer if they had not receive it. In order to do 
so, socio-economic characteristics such as household’s head age, education, amount of 
assets, and the socio-economic region, among others were used to predict the 
probability of participating in the program. Then, each participant was matched with a 
non-participant that had the same propensity to participate.  
 
The main advantage of this method is that it allows to give more weight on those 
untreated who are very similar to those in the treatment group based on observable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In the first stages of the program, during the pilot and first years of implementation, the treatment was 
assigned randomly in order to be able to estimate the impact of Oportunidades on different variables; 
However, once that the program proved to be efficient, the allocation of transfers was based to those 
whose income was estimated to be below the wellbeing line and live in areas in which the program has 
coverage. Thus, the assignment is not random any more and there are individuals that accomplish the 
selection criteria but do not receive the CCT.  
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characteristics and who are predicted to be likely to be part of Oportunidades but are 
not. The disadvantage is that unobservable characteristics such as motivation or cultural 
believes –for example- are left aside. Therefore, it is needed to assume that the 
matching was made based on enough observable characteristics that are correlated with 
unobservable characteristics that there is no difference left (Glennerster & Takavarasha, 
2013). 
 
As it can be seen in Section 5.5, the estimation of the propensity score matching was 
based on socio-economic characteristics and in regional divisions of Mexico, these last 
attempted to group individuals not only in wellbeing indicators but in cultural regions of 
the country. By doing this, it was expected to reduce the bias arose from omitted 
unobservable differences. Additionally, since the estimations were conducted separately 
for men/women and indigenous/non-indigenous, it is also feasible that the observable 
characteristics included into the model are sufficiently enough to avoid the remaining of 
existing differences across groups.  
 
However, since by nature the unobservable characteristics are impossible to observe it is 
not possible to test this and the way to proceed is to assume that the counterfactual that 
was created is a valid one.  
 
Another important assumption is that there is nothing correlated with access that also 
has an effect on the labor supply outcomes (Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013). This is 
important because although Oportunidades has a large coverage there are still 
individuals that have a high probability of receiving the program but live in villages in 
which the program has no presence yet; in some cases, the matching would compare 
people with equal probability than those who are treated but who live in areas where 
there is no access to the program. Nevertheless, since the groups are balanced in 
observable characteristics at the common support region, it is unlikely that the villages 
with access and non-access are systematically different and it could be assumed that the 
potential bias was sufficiently overcame.  
 
All these limitations were considered in the design of the model, and the selection of the 
variables used to estimate the probability of participating was based in all the potential 
sources of selection bias that could lead to mistaken estimations of the impact of the 
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program. Therefore, the results could be taken as an empirical evidence that 
Oportunidades does not create disincentives on their participants for them to reduce the 
amount of labor they supply, which, in this case, is an indicator of the program not 
creating income dependency on those who receive the transfer.  
8.	  Conclusions	  and	  policy	  implication	  	  	  
Oportunidades aims to boost the human development of the population living below the 
Minimum Well-Being Line to break the inter-generational cycle of poverty. Through 
monetary conditional transfers, the program attempts to encourage household’s 
investments in education, health, and nutrition. Although it has been deeply evaluated 
and proven to be an efficient strategy to improve these conditions, its success at 
reducing poverty depends, at a great extent, on whether the transfers do not affect adult 
work incentives in a negative direction. 
 
Due to the high rates of poverty in rural Mexico and specially across the indigenous 
population (three out every four persons face poverty, and 21% live in extreme 
poverty), the research investigates whether Oportunidades has created incentives to 
increase the time dedicated to productive activities and the probability of working, of 
adult participants living in rural locations with less than 2,500 inhabitants, or if it rather 
generates a non-labor income dependency that would produce the socially undesirable 
outcome of making beneficiary adults to work less which consequently would reduce 
the likelihood of alleviating poverty in the long-term. 
 
In order to test if the transfers create disincentives to work (a proxy to non-labor income 
dependency), a Propensity Score Matching method was conducted taking advantage of 
the current design of the program, the big sample contained in ENIGH, and on a basic 
microeconomic model of time allocation.  
 
The main findings are that there are not statistically significant effects of the CCT on 
adult labor supply decisions in rural areas neither for the non-indigenous nor for the 
indigenous population; Therefore, it can be said that Oportunidades does not create 
dependency on their rural participants, at least not a non-labor income one.  
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Consequently, the fact that poverty has not been significant reduced in rural areas, and 
specifically across the indigenous population, is not because the program is creating 
counter incentives to the amount of weekly hours spent at work (the intensive margin) 
nor that participants become less likely to participate in the labor market (the extensive 
margin) when they receive the transfer but rather because of other determinants that are 
outside of the scope of the present research.  
 
Likewise, it can be said that the already, deeply, evaluated benefits of the program in 
terms of education, health, and nutrition are not diminished by the program creating 
dependency and it might be that the rise in human capital would be translated in a 
decrease of long-term poverty once those children who increased their years of 
education, health, and nutrition conditions become economically active. 
 
Finally, the main contribution of this research is that it presents a more profound 
analysis of the causal relation between a CCT program and work supply disaggregated 
by ethnicity. Although in Mexico, 7% of the population speaks one of the native ethnic 
languages and 26% consider themselves indigenous, they have been systematically 
excluded from previous analysis that deal with the relation between Oportunidades and 
working incentives. Thus, including them and being able to reject the hypothesis that 
the CCT create incentives for them to work less and make them dependent of the 
transfers has a great value both in terms of research and for the strategic design of the 
program.
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Appendix	  A:	  Monthly	  monetary	  value	  of	  the	  transfers	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Operational Rules of the program Oportunidades 2012 
Boys Girls
US$11.50 US$11.50
US$11.50 US$11.50
US$11.50 US$11.50
US$13.40 US$13.40
US$17.20 US$17.20
US$22.90 US$22.90
Boys Girls
US$33.63 US$35.50
US$35.50 US$39.36
US$37.45 US$43.18
Boys Girls
US$56.56 US$64.97
US$60.76 US$69.17
US$64.20 US$73.37
Food "Vivir Mejor"
Children "Vivir Mejor"
Eldery "Vivir Mejor"
US$4.60
US$9.17
US$8.03
US$22.31
2nd grade 
3rd grade 
Monthly monetary value of transfers
US$17.20Nutrition
6th grade 
1st grade 
2nd grade 
3rd grade 
High School
1st grade 
Secondary Schol
3rd grade
4th grade 
5th grade 
1st grade 
2nd grade
Primary school
Monthly monetary value of scholarships 
Electricty 
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Appendix	  B:	  Variables	  used	  by	  the	  Mexican	  Ministry	  of	  Development	  to	  
estimate	  income	  and	  identify	  eligible	  candidates	  
	  
Source: Oportunidades’ web site 2014 	  	  
 Variables used by Oportunidades to estimate per capita income and select 
potential candidates to participate  
Rural 
Model  
Demographic dependency index: (#0-15+#>64)  / #16-64  X 
Logarithm of the total amount of household members  X 
Average schooling of the head and spouse with complete primary but 
incomplete secondary education  X 
Average schooling of the head and spouse with complete secondary or 
higher education  X 
# Members within the household with subordinated work  X 
# Members within the household with independent work  X 
Food insecurity complemented: any of the two cases  X 
At least one member of the household has access to medical service because 
of her job  X 
The households’ head is an independent worker and at least one of the 
members has access to medical service because of her job  X 
The household receives remittances  X 
Rent the house X 
Number of rooms in the house, not including the kitchen, aisles, nor 
bathrooms  X 
Indicator of exclusive use of a bathroom with access to water  X 
Indicator of solid floor in the major part of the house  X 
Indicator of  “recubrimiento” floor in the major part of the house X 
Use of fuel like wood, coal, or oil to cook  X 
Does not have a refrigerator  X 
Do not own a car  X 
Do not have video player nor DVD  X 
Do not have an electric hoven nor a microwave  X 
Index of social backwardness at the municipal level  X !
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Appendix	  C:	  Outcomes	  of	  the	  Probit	  Model	  	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Women Men Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Head and spouse average years of formal education -0.115*** -0.137*** -0.0342* -0.0615**
(0.0178) (0.0177) (0.0186) (0.0246)
Household's head age 0.00640 0.0142** 0.0191*** 0.0183***
(0.00540) (0.00672) (0.00493) (0.00590)
Socio-economic region 6 -0.936*** -1.128*** -0.364 0.0363
(0.206) (0.203) (0.228) (0.222)
Socio-economic region 5 -0.997*** -1.170*** -0.210 -0.248
(0.236) (0.247) (0.213) (0.270)
Socio-economic region 4 -0.901*** -1.025*** -0.416** -0.426**
(0.245) (0.219) (0.205) (0.208)
Socio-economic region 3 -0.927*** -1.026*** -0.610*** -0.913***
(0.166) (0.163) (0.200) (0.218)
Socio-economic region 2 -0.588*** -0.726*** 0.0775 -0.132
(0.169) (0.177) (0.161) (0.155)
Speaks a native language -0.986*** -0.565* 0.293** 0.260*
(0.364) (0.306) (0.139) (0.147)
Fuel=1 if use wood or oil to cook 0.566*** 0.581*** 0.794*** 0.850***
(0.102) (0.117) (0.148) (0.138)
# of members younger than 18 years old 0.403*** 0.449*** 0.205*** 0.144**
(0.0483) (0.0767) (0.0498) (0.0604)
Demographic Dependency Ratio -0.280*** -0.293 0.258
(0.0932) (0.190) (0.170)
Crowding Index -0.0942** -0.133** -0.0722 -0.0990*
(0.0472) (0.0542) (0.0521) (0.0540)
# of light bulbs in the dwelling -0.0615*** -0.0859***
(0.0207) (0.0247)
Microwave=1 if owns a microwave -0.348***
(0.121)
share bathroom with no access to water -0.191 -0.188
(0.124) (0.131)
Car=1 if someone in the household owns a car -0.710***
(0.231)
# of women in reproductive age 0.135*
(0.0687)
Constant 0.859** 0.855* -1.228*** -0.862*
(0.404) (0.467) (0.378) (0.481)
Observations 1,326 1,137 1,124 932
Weight 2,796,411 2,409,511 2,352,336 2,352,336
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Oportunidades=1 if treated
Non-indigenous Indigenous
Probit model for the estimation of the propensity score
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Appendix	  D:	  	  Balancing	  test	  for	  the	  indigenous	  population.	  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Variable Treated Control Difference t-test p>t
Head and spouse average years of formal education 5.245 4.967 0.278 0.87 0.386
Household's head age 45.551 44.738 0.813 0.78 0.438
Socio-economic region 6 0.042 0.079 -0.037 -1.62 0.106
Socio-economic region 5 0.051 0.093 -0.042 -1.68 0.094
Socio-economic region 4 0.201 0.122 0.079 2.24 0.025
Socio-economic region 3 0.215 0.280 -0.065 -1.57 0.117
Socio-economic region 2 0.336 0.313 0.023 0.52 0.607
Socio-economic region 1 0.154 0.112 0.042 1.28 0.201
Speaks a native language 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.58 0.563
Fuel=1 if use wood or oil to cook 0.607 0.565 0.042 0.88 0.378
# of members younger than 18 years old 1.841 2.042 -0.201 -1.38 0.167
Demographic Dependency Ratio 0.817 0.879 -0.061 -0.85 0.393
Crowding Index 2.639 2.742 -0.103 -0.73 0.465
# of light bulbs in the dwelling 4.879 4.692 0.187 0.77 0.443
Microwave=1 if owns a microwave 0.168 0.229 -0.061 -1.58 0.116
Car=1 if someone in the household owns a car 0.093 0.150 -0.056 -1.78 0.076
# of women in reproductive age 1.341 1.257 0.084 1.1 0.271
Variable Treated Control Difference t-test p>t
Head and spouse average years of formal education 5.459 5.069 0.390 1.73 0.084
Household's head age 44.402 44.884 -0.482 -0.58 0.559
Socio-economic region 6 0.077 0.124 -0.047 -2.1 0.036
Socio-economic region 5 0.080 0.096 -0.017 -0.78 0.433
Socio-economic region 4 0.185 0.198 -0.014 -0.47 0.638
Socio-economic region 3 0.264 0.237 0.028 0.86 0.393
Socio-economic region 2 0.281 0.273 0.008 0.25 0.804
Socio-economic region 1 0.113 0.072 0.041 1.93 0.055
Speaks a native language 0.022 0.036 -0.014 -1.11 0.269
Fuel=1 if use wood or oil to cook 0.556 0.584 -0.028 -0.75 0.454
# of members younger than 18 years old 2.055 2.121 -0.066 -0.64 0.52
Demographic Dependency Ratio 0.788 0.866 -0.078 -1.74 0.082
Crowding Index 2.739 2.881 -0.142 -2.25 0.451
# of light bulbs in the dwelling 4.719 4.606 0.113 0.61 0.545
Microwave=1 if owns a microwave 0.182 0.215 -0.033 -1.12 0.265
Car=1 if someone in the household owns a car 0.094 0.138 -0.044 -1.86 0.064
# of women in reproductive age 1.320 1.298 0.022 0.35 0.725
Mean
Balancing test: Mean diffrence by treatment status within the common support region
Non-indigenous women 
Mean
Non-indigenous men 
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